

ARISTOTLE'S ACCOUNT OF NATURE.

359 daring, in the same place, what this nature is ;

namely, that it is $4^{*}OC^{\wedge}> \wedge^{\wedge U}X^{\wedge C} -/*P^{\circ}f> \wedge W$
 $*ev \wedge^{*}OC^{\wedge C}>$ soul, or part of soul, or not without soul; — and from thence inferring, that it properly belongs to a physiologer, to treat concerning the soul also. But he concludes afterwards, *oiJgs Traaa^vycn \$iW*, that the whole soul is not nature; — whence it remains, that, according to Aristotle's sense, nature is $r? -^{\wedge}vyr^{\wedge} juffx>c, \% prij avsv$
 $ifw^{\wedge}c$, either part of a soul, or not without soul ;• — that is, either a lower part or faculty of some conscious soul ; or else an inferior kind of life by itself, which is riot without soul, but subordinate to it, and dependent on it.

22. As for the bodies of anim.als, Aristotle¹¹ first »resolves in general, that nature in them is either the whote soul, or else some part of it ; $^{\wedge}vcric we y /a-$
 $vowa, Kcuwg TO reXoc TOU fa>oi$ », $rjroi iraaa r| ^{\wedge}v$
 $(>7> fj /ifpoc$
 $n avrife^{*}$ Nature, as the moving principle, or as that which acts artificially for ends (so far as concerns the bodies of animals), is either the whole soul, or else some part of it. — But afterward he determines more particularly, that the plastic nature is not the whole soul in animals, but only some part of

it; *ov Traffa -fivvrr*) $^{\wedge}vcric, aXXa n juoptov avriJc$,
that TS, nature in animals, properly so called, is some lower power or faculty lodged in their respective souls, whether sensitive or rational.

And that there is plastic nature in the souls of animals, the same Aristotle elsewhere * • affirms and proves after this manner : «•' De AH. i. 2.

$' | , , > \bullet , , * | \sim | ^{\wedge}$
c. 4. p. 26. s.
TO owe^ov ate *T avavTia* $^{\wedge}epo/xcva$, TO TTW *p K.ai rr/v*
torn. ii. oper.

$8ia(T7raa6)7 aer at yap EL JULITTI$ *ecrrai TO /cwXv-*
etS' fcm, TOVT' COTIV -n ^{\wedge}v)(i?, Kat TO atnov

^{TOU} *av*^{dv}
KOI ^{TP} *WSai*. What is that, which,
in the bo-

- » Be Partib. AnimaL Jib. i, cap. i.
p. 473.

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